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Abstract 
Motivated by the limited evidence on the positive link between social capital and firm performance, 
this paper explores this potential driver of firm performance at the firm rather than macro-level by 
employing a novel approach: we capture social capital at a community level rather than focus on the 
narrow aspect of entrepreneurs’ own social network. Using Principal Component Analysis to 
aggregate various trust, norm, and network related variables to construct social capital variables with 
more than 150,000 firm-level observations for firm performance variables, this paper identifies an 
overall positive and significant effect of social capital on firm performance in Denmark. These 
effects are robust to firm-level social capital measures, different sampling years and alternative 
measures of firm performance (return on asset, current ratio, solvency ratio and profit margin) and 
network (Putnam and Olson groups). 
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1. Introduction 
Current literature on social networking and entrepreneurial activity has acknowledged that 
entrepreneurial activity can be heavily influenced by network relationships (as a form of social 
capital) which direct resource flows to entrepreneurs who are somehow better “connected” (e.g.  
Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986). Adler and Kwon (2002) contend that social 
capital, or the resources that entrepreneurs may access through their personal networks, allows 
entrepreneurs to identify opportunities, mobilize resources and build legitimacy for their firm (see 
also Bhagavatula et al., 2010; Batjargal, 2003 and Elfring and Hulsink, 2003).  
Despite the growing interests in this matter in the literature, consensus has not been reached about 
the social capital-performance link in the firm context. According to at least Maurer and Ebers 
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(2006), Stuart and Sorensen (2007) and Stam et al. (2014), there exists conflicting perspectives 
regarding the specific network properties that constitute social capital. While some have focused on 
network structure (see e.g. Stam, 2010), others have considered the strength of entrepreneur’s 
network relationships or the resources held by their network contacts (see e.g. Batjargal, 2003, 
McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). Disagreement looms largely over whether a sparse or cohesive network, 
weak or strong ties, and diverse or homogenous network could potentially promote firm growth 
(Renzulli et al., 2000). While some have argued that cohesive, strong-tie networks are conducive for 
new firms (Hite and Hesterly, 2001), others have contended that diverse, weak –tie networks are 
favorable at the early stages of firm development. (Elfring and Hulsink, 2007). Martinez and Aldrich 
(2011) also point out that ambiguity exists about the temporal contingencies that govern when certain 
forms of social capital are most beneficial for firm performance.  
Motivated by the above gaps in the literature, this paper aims to provide an up-to-date analysis on the 
role of social capital for firm performance in Denmark, by examining a broader social capital 
environment rather than focusing on the narrow aspect of entrepreneurs’ personal networks as the 
sole measure of social capital that might matter for firm performance. We measure social capital by 
capturing notions of trust, norm (civic attitude) and two different network types as defined by 
Putnam et al. (1993) and Olson (1982) in 14 Danish regions with over 1,000 postal locations. The 
potential effect of social capital endowment is then investigated on firm performance (measured by 
various financial and innovation performance indicators such as return on assets, solvency ratio, 
current ratio and profit margin), capturing border regions and the rural/ urban divide. The underlying 
hypothesis is that businesses, regardless of large or small, perform better by doing business in an 
environment with high local trust, good civil norms and growth enhancing networks. We 
acknowledge that there exists a natural limitation to our approach, since our social capital variable is 
measured at regional level, augmented for firm-level information. However, while entrepreneur’s 
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personal networks could potential reveal some level of firm-level social capital information, it is 
however narrowly defined, and not specifically representative for the entire firm.  
This paper therefore contributes to the current literature in three ways: (1) it contributes toward 
bridging the gap between two related strands of literature by linking the macro type of analysis on 
the effect of social capital on macroeconomic growth (see e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997) to the micro 
level analysis on the effect of local social capital (previously only in the form of entrepreneur’s 
personal networks) on firm performance and growth. (2) This paper also addresses regional 
imbalance in the context of both social capital and firm development by exploring the potential 
urban-rural, border-non border region divide with regard to firm performance. (3) We introduce 
measures of social capital at different spatial levels. Specifically, not only do we augment regional 
level social capital for firm-level, regional-industry and postal code-industry level firm performance 
information, but also we construct a firm-level social capital measure by interacting social capital 
dummies with firm size to address the lack of social capital information at the firm-level. 
Using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to combine various trust, norm and network related 
variables from the Danish value studies, this study constructs its own social capital variables, to find 
a generally strong positive effect of social capital on firm performance as measured by return on 
asset, current ratio, solvency ratio and profit margin. The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 provides firm-level, region-industry and postal 
code-industry level analysis, including robustness checks to firm-level social capital measures, 
different sampling years and alternative measures of firm performance and network, and discusses 
the results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Literature 
As mentioned earlier, the current state of literature on social capital and firm performance has mainly 
focused on entrepreneur’s personal networks as the sole social capital factor that potentially 
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determines firm growth. In the field of entrepreneurship, social capital has emerged as a contextual 
complement to theories focusing on individual traits by acknowledging that entrepreneurs are 
embedded in a social context that enables and constrains behavior (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986). This 
line of reasoning is well rooted in the theoretical literature on planned individual behavior and 
evolutionary economic change (see Ajzen, 1991; Nelson and Winter, 1982). The popularity of 
network-based theorizing is reflected in the surge of studies examining networks and entrepreneurial 
outcomes at different levels of analysis including the role of social capital in the creation of new 
firms (De Carolis et al., 2009), the performance of corporate strategic initiatives (Lechner et al., 
2010), the innovativeness of regional clusters (Whittington et al., 2009), and the transformation of 
organizational fields. (Van Wijk et al., 2013). Although entrepreneur’s network relationships can be 
regarded an asset for firms, there is no consensus on what properties of these networks constitute 
social capital. So far the literature mainly concludes that entrepreneurs’ personal networks can be 
evaluated along three key aspects: the relational, structural and resource dimensions of social capital 
(Gulati et al., 2011; Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  
The relational dimension of entrepreneurs’ personal networks considers the nature and quality of 
interactions between exchange partners, highlighting a possible trade-off between weak and strong 
ties. On the one hand, researchers have employed Granovetter’s (1973) weak tie theory to argue that 
entrepreneurs can gain access to more novel information through weak ties. This insight originates in 
homophily theory (McPherson et al., 2001), which holds that strong overlapping bonds tend to form 
among socially proximate individuals, making weak ties more likely to link people from distant 
social circles. On the other hand, scholars have stressed the benefits of strong ties by arguing that tie 
strength increases the willingness and ability of an entrepreneur’s network contacts to provide 
needed resources (Batjargal, 2003). This argument dates back to research on embeddedness which 
has shown that frequent, close interactions facilitate trusted resource exchanges and tacit knowledge 
transfer (Uzzi, 1997).  
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The structural dimension of social capital considers how the position of entrepreneurs in a structure 
of relationships creates advantage. One line of research has employed Burt (1992)’s theory on 
“structural holes”, defined as the absence of direct relations among a focal entrepreneur’s network 
contacts, and suggest that entrepreneur obtain strategic benefits by forging ties to members of a 
network group who are not connected to one another (Batjargal, 2010). Based on a resource 
dependence logic (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), this insight stems from the idea that mediating 
exchanges between network members who are not directly connected “increases an entrepreneur’s 
timely access to, and control over, external resources” (Burt, 2005). By contrast, another line of 
research has adopted Coleman (1988)’s theory of network closure to emphasize the benefits 
associated with cohesive networks in which entrepreneurs’ network contacts are directly connected 
and “structural holes” are absent (Hansen, 1995). Based on exchange theory (Blau, 1964), this 
perspective maintains that closed networks generate trust, social support and norms of reciprocity 
that enable cooperation among network members (Obstfeld, 2005).  
The resource dimension of social capital directly considers the resources held by entrepreneurs’ 
network contacts (Batjargal, 2003). Some have used social resource theory (Lin, 2001) to suggest 
that diverse networks, comprising members with different backgrounds, are beneficial because they 
enable entrepreneurs to quickly locate needed resources, as each network member with diverse 
background serves as a reference point to a specific resource and specialty that the focal entrepreneur 
might need. This line of work has also drawn on theory on institutions, arguing that the actual quality 
of firms is difficult to observe directly such that entrepreneurs with diverse ties to prominent 
affiliates benefit from status transfer (Stuart et al., 1999). Others, however have underscored the 
value of homogenous networks. This line of research, rooted in theories of absorptive capacity 
(Hansen, 1999), argue that knowledge sharing occurs more readily when entrepreneurs and their 
network contacts have shared cognitions due to a common language or shared narrative (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998). 
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Recent empirical evidence on the impact of social capital on business performance has focused 
mainly on corporate culture (internal social capital) rather than the external social capital 
environment with perhaps the exception of Fritsch and Wyrwich (2015), which does focus on the 
impact of social capital environment on the level of new business formation and self-employment. 
For examples, Hernandez-Carrion et al. (2016) examines the impact of entrepreneurs’ own social 
capital on the economic performance of 951 surveyed small businesses and found that economic 
performance is influenced more by entrepreneurs’ own professional and institutional network 
resources than by the other network resources. Pratono and Mahmood (2015) survey entrepreneurs’ 
own network resources among small and medium sized businesses in Indonesia and found that 
entrepreneurial orientation may have either a positive or negative impact on firm performance by 
encouraging firms to be more effective and achieve greater performance or having a negative effect 
on firms with superior entrepreneurial orientation. Saha and Benerjee (2015) survey small businesses 
in West Bengal and found that the impact of social capital on firm performance is significantly 
greater in firms engaged in formal and informal networking in contrast to firms embedded only in the 
informal network. Zhao et al. (2018) found that corporate culture promotion is negatively related to 
firm market value, positively related to innovation output and not significantly related to firm 
financial performance. They also found that the negative effect of corporate culture promotion on 
firm market value is driven by small firms and firms located in less developed provinces. 
The above theories on entrepreneurs’ personal networks and firm performance suggest two different 
yet interrelated conceptualizations of social capital that might enhance firm performance. On the one 
hand, the “bridging view” of social capital argues that entrepreneurs with large, diverse, and weakly 
connected personal networks identify more novel opportunities but face difficulties assembling 
resources to exploit them. On the other hand, the “bonding view” of social capital maintains that 
entrepreneurs with small, cohesive personal networks composed of strong ties can more effectively 
mobilize resources around new projects but lack access to fresh ideas. Unsurprisingly, the empirical 
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research on this matter which largely focuses only on entrepreneurs’ personal networks has yielded 
mainly inconclusive results. For example, Batjargal (2003) finds that relational embeddedness and 
resource embeddedness have direct positive impacts on firm performance, whereas structural 
embeddedness has no direct impacts on performance, based on interviews with 75 Russian 
entrepreneurs in 1995 and 1999. Pratono and Mahmood (2014) finds that resource embeddedness, 
rather than relational embeddedness has significant positive impact on firm performance based on 
interviews with 700 respondents published by the Surabaya government in Indonesia. 
To incorporate both the bridging and bonding views on social capital and clarify their 
interrelatedness, we examine social capital based on a comprehensive view. We believe examining 
social capital only in the context of entrepreneurs’ personal networks is insufficient as networking is 
only one aspect of the multi-faceted social capital concept. The biased focus only on networks has 
probably been the source of conflict and inconclusiveness of the results on this matter. The current 
state of literature generally agrees that shared norms, trust and social networks are the main 
components of social capital (Coleman, 1998; Ostrom (1990, 1999); Putnam, 2000). We therefore 
examine social capital in the context of its impact on firm performance as a social capital 
environment, which comprises trust, norms and networks among the local environment that the focal 
firm is based. It’s not just that the entrepreneurs’ personal networks that matter for firm performance, 
but also the general social trust, civic norm and networking environment that the firm faces locally.  
3. Analysis 
3.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Following the approach introduced in Bjornskov (2006) and Wang and Steiner (2015), social capital 
is measured by three components: trust, norm and network. The data are obtained from the 1999 and 
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2008 waves of Danish Value Studies (DVS)1. The trust component of social capital measures how 
much one person generally trusts other people in one’s neighborhood, and how much confidence one 
has in private, public and political institutions. We use the first principal component analysis (PCA) 
to combine the percentage of respondents that give a positive answer to a trust-related question and 
form the variable trust (domestic), if the trust-related questions concerning only domestic institutions 
and organizations, and trust (foreign) if the questions concern foreign institutions and organizations. 
Norm is measured by the PCA combination of the percentage of respondents that do not justify 
various generally socially unacceptable behaviors, such as cheating on tax, lying in own interest, 
accepting a bribe and drunk driving etc. The use of PCA for capturing a latent variable as 
culture/milieu is standard in the literature, since a cultural milieu model is under-specified if a factor 
variable is not used. Recent empirical work (see e.g. Tubadji, 2014; Tubadji and Nijkamp, 2014) find 
factor variables as stronger predictor of the cultural milieu potential than individual variables such as 
self-reported trust etc. 
The network component of social capital is measured in three ways: first, we use PCA to combine 
the membership in all organizations surveyed in the value studies to form the network (all group) 
variable. Second, following the approach introduced in Wang and Steiner (2015) and Madsen et al. 
(2017), we differentiate two types of organizations: “Putnam” and “Olson”. The “Putnam” 
organizations (see Putnam et al., 1993) are religious, education, arts and sports organizations that do 
not exclude horizontal integration, i.e. people across these organizations can bond and social well 
without confliction of interests. On the contrary, the “Olson” organizations (see Olson, 1982) are 
special interest groups that prevent people across organizations to communicate and cooperate in an 
effective manner, the examples are labor unions, political parties and professional organizations. The 
                                                            
1  There were 1,023 and 1,507 individuals being surveyed in the 1999 and 2009 waves of Danish Value Studies, 
respectively. Regional identifier (Amter) and Postal codes are available for regional level social capital aggregation. Due 
to the low observations for each postal code area (1 to 2 at most), to meaningfully calculate regional level social capital, 
we decided to aggregate individual values to the 14-Amter regional level. Therefore, firms located in the same region 
(Amter) share the same social capital environment with same trust, norm and network societal values. 
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PCA combination of membership in “Putnam” organizations forms the variable Network (Putnam), 
and the PCA combination of membership in “Olson” organizations forms the variable Network 
(Olson). The detailed survey questions and PCA coefficients used to construct the above social 
capital variables can be found in Table A1 in the online appendix. 
Firm performance is measured by three firm-level key financial performance indicators: return on 
assets, current ratio and solvency ratio for all Danish firms2. We also include profit margin in the 
robustness check. The data are obtained from the Orbis and Amadeus database. Return on asset is 
defined as the ratio of net income to total asset. Current ratio is defined as the ratio of current asset to 
current liability. Solvency ratio is defined as the ratio of net income plus depreciation to short term 
and long-term liability. Profit margin is defined as the ratio of net income to total revenue. 
We control firm size, regional health status, education status (to what extent it is high), urban 
dummies, and border dummies in the relationship concerning social capital and firm performance. 
Firm size is measured by total asset of a firm. Health status is the percentage of respondents who 
identify themselves as being in “excellent health” and “good health” in a given Danish Amter. High 
education is measured by the percentage of respondents who identify themselves as having 
completed “first stage tertiary education” in a given Danish region. Both health and education 
variables are obtained from the DVS. The urban dummy equals 1 if an underlying region has a 
degree of urbanization value greater than 4 out of a 1 to 6-point scale as defined by the DVS, and 0 
other wise. The border dummy equals 1 if a firm belongs to the Southern Jutland region, and 0 
otherwise. 
Table 1 gives summary statistics and definitions for all variables involved in the estimation of the 
2008 firm-level sample. A close look at the means and standard deviations shows low variability in 
                                                            
2 There are in total 739,588 Danish firms registered with Orbis and Amadeus from the year 2000 to 2013. Observations 
for return on assets, current ratio and solvency ratio are 178,886, 192,637 and 200,427 respectively. Profit margin has 
only 20,617 observations, therefore is used as a robustness check.  
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the social capital variables and high variability in firm performance indicators. These are in line with 
expectations, as Denmark is a rather homogeneous small open economy with similar culture across 
regions. On the other hand, the data suggests that firm types (indicated by total asset) and 
performances are diverse. This seems to suggest that if any robust effects of social capital on firm 
performance can be found in a sample like this, these effects must be strong, since small variations in 
social capital will likely cause huge variations in firm performance. A correlation between all 
variables can also be found in Table A2 in the online appendix. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the 2008 Firm-Level Sample 
Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Trust 
(domestic) 
PCA combination of domestically trust-
related indicators measured in percentage of 
respondents given positive answers in a given 
Danish region (14-Amter) 
695646 65.62 3.16 59.40 72.58 
Trust 
(foreign) 
PCA combination of foreign trust-related 
indicators measured in percentage of 
respondents given positive answers in a given 
Danish region (14-Amter) 
695646 56.92 3.73 47.74 62.45 
Norm PCA combination of norms-related indicators 
measured in percentage of respondents given 
positive answers in a given Danish region (14-
Amter) 
695646 52.60 3.97 40.48 60.47 
Network 
(all groups) 
PCA combination of Network(all groups)-
related indicators measured in percentage of 
respondents given positive answers in a given 
Danish region (14-Amter) 
695646 29.09 1.37 26.57 34.06 
Network 
(Putnam 
group) 
PCA combination of Network(Putnam group)-
related indicators measured in percentage of 
respondents given positive answers in a given 
Danish region (14-Amter) 
695646 12.10 1.10 10.05 15.59 
Network 
(Olson 
group) 
PCA combination of Network(Olson group)-
related indicators measured in percentage of 
respondents given positive answers in a given 
Danish region (14-Amter) 
695646 23.12 1.20 20.52 27.68 
Firm size 
(total assets) 
Total asset of a firm as of 2008 217085 27630.45 2311946 -51.89 6.64E+08 
Health 
status 
Percentage of respondents identify themselves 
as being in “excellent health” and “good 
health” in a given Danish region (14-Amter) 
695646 79.30 4.09 71.15 84.87 
High 
education 
Percentage of respondents identify themselves 
as have completed “first stage tertiary 
education” in a given Danish region (14-
Amter) 
695646 38.45 10.95 14.29 53.97 
Urban Dummy variable that equals 1 if a given 
Danish region (14-Amter) has a “degree of 
695646 0.54 0.48 0 1 
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urbanization” value greater than 4 (in a 1 to 6 
scale) and 0 otherwise. 
Border Dummy variable that equals 1 when a firm is 
located in the Southern Jutland region 
(Danish-German border region), and 0 
otherwise. 
695646 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Return on 
Assets  
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
 
178866 12.56 96.35 -998.75 995.74 
Current 
Ratio 
  
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
192637 6.14 14.03 0 100 
Solvency 
Ratio 
  
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
200427 50.16 41.73 -100 100 
Profit 
Margin 
  
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
 
20617 11.01 33.39 -100 100 
Notes: For specific sub-indicators (original questions used in the 2008 Danish value studies surveys), see 
Table A1 in the online appendix. Firms located in the same region (one of 14) are assumed to face the same 
level of social capital (trust, norm and network), resident health environment (health status), education level 
(high education). 
          3.2. Estimation (firm-level regressions)  
This section attempts to estimate the following equation: 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗  3      (1) 
where the firm performance variables are return on assets, current ratio and solvency ratio; social 
capital variables are Trust (domestic), Trust (foreign), Norm, Network (all group), Network 
(Putnam), and Network (Olson); 𝑋 is a set of control variables that include firm size, health status, 
high education, urban dummies and border dummies, while 𝑢 denotes the error term. Due to the fact 
that each of the four regional-level social capital measures has only 14 unique values, we adjust the 
standard errors to account for potential clusters in the regional level social capital variables. In each 
regression with regional level social capital measures augmented for firm-level information, 14 
clusters are identified for each social capital variable. The cluster-robust inference is standard 
approach in the literature to address the above issue (see e.g. Cameron and Miller (2013)). 
                                                            
3 i, represents the firm level information, it should be noted that apart from firm size, all other explanatory variables are 
measured at regional level.  j represents the unique social capital observation that are augmented for firm-level 
information.  
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The OLS estimations with clustered standard errors presented in Table 2 test the effect of social 
capital on firm performance. From Table 2, Columns (1) to (5) show the results on return on assets as 
a measure of firm performance, with Columns (6) to (10) and Columns (11) to (15) showing the 
results for current ratio and solvency ratio respectively. Individually, all three aspects of social 
capital (trust, norm and network) show strong significant influence on firm performance, although 
comparatively speaking, trust and network stand out, with the effect of norm being considerably 
weaker. For e.g., the coefficients on Trust and Network (Columns (1), (2) and (4)) suggest that a 1 
unit increase in trust in domestic and foreign institutions, and membership in organizations boost 
return on asset by 0.744%, 0.649% and 1.472%, respectively, while a one unit increase in social 
norm (Column (2)) boosts return on asset by about 0.296%.  When including all regressors (i.e. two 
trust measures, norm and network (all group)) into the regression, trust (foreign) and network in most 
cases continue to show strong results, whilst the effect of norm is consistently smaller (Columns (5) 
and (10)) with the exception of Column (15). It should be noted that in Column (5), network 
becomes insignificant, and in all three cases where all regressors are included, Trust (domestic) is 
insignificant. Given the strong correlations between our social capital variables (see Table A2 in the 
online appendix), multicollinearity could be the potential cause of the above mentioned insignificant 
results. A set of comprehensive multicollinearity tests (the Farrar-Glauber Multicollinearity Chi-
squares, F and pairwise t-tests for all three main specifications (Columns (5), (10) and (15)) in Table 
2) are provided in Table A3 in the online appendix, further confirms the existence of 
multicollinearity for all of our key explanatory social capital variables, and virtually all control 
variables except for firms size (total asset). The consistent positive effect of social capital on firm 
growth is evident by looking at all three firm growth measures.  
Trust in domestic institutions seems to matter more for firm growth than trust in foreign institutions. 
This is evident when exploring all three measures of firm performances. Cross-comparing these three 
measures show that the magnitude of the effect of social capital on return on assets and solvency 
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ratio seems to be generally stronger than the effect on current ratio. Social capital seems to matter 
more for long-term liquidity (solvency ratio) than short-term liquidity (current ratio). Our results 
from networks suggest that memberships in organizations are important for firm growth. So far, we 
haven’t distinguished between the Putnam and Olson groups introduced earlier in the data section. 
Later on in the robustness check section, we explore the effect of memberships in these two groups 
on firm performance individually. What can be concluded now is that membership in at least one 
group shows significant positive impact on firm performance, and that firms thrive in a community 
environment where people social more with each other, gaining trust, establishing social norms in the 
process. In general, our findings on the positive effect of social capital (especially networking) on 
firm performance is in line with findings from Aldrich and Zimmer (1986), Hoang and Antoncic 
(2003) and Stam (2010). 
Moreover, turning to the control variables, the firm size (measured by total asset) control turns out to 
be insignificant for firm performance, suggesting that – as expected - small firms have just the same 
opportunity to be successful as their large counterparts. Both high education status (human capital) 
and good health status turn out to be good for firm performance. At least in the case of Denmark, the 
urban advantage exists for firm performance as we see a skewed resource distribution towards the 
urban area in Denmark. This is evident by looking at the significant coefficients on the urban 
dummies for all ROE regressions and in one case, for the solvency ratio regression, since ROE is 
widely agreed upon as the best measure of firm performance. It should be noted however, that the 
results for urban dummies among current ratio regressions and most of the solvency ratios are 
insignificant, this suggests that the impact of urban dummies on leverage related firm performance 
(i.e. current ratio and solvency ratio) measures are at best inconclusive. Our results also suggest that 
the Danish-German border region seems to do worse in terms of firm performance. This result is 
however not strong, as it’s only supported by one current ratio regression and four solvency ratio 
regressions. The F-statistics and their p-values suggest the variables included in the regression are 
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jointly significant in all cases, and the R-squares (between 10% and 24%) suggest that that the model 
is reasonably well explained. 
3.3 Estimation (region-industry and postal code-industry level regressions) 
To address the natural limitation of our social capital data (aggregated from 1,000 to 1,500+ 
respondents to 14 region level), we aggregate the firm level performance data onto two different 
levels (1) region-industry level, in which a particular industry within a particular region is treated as 
one observation, so that we differentiate industries within a particular region to take into account 
industry heterogeneity. (2) Postal code-industry level, which is similar to the region-industry 
aggregation, except that we identify a particular industry within a specific postal code as one 
observation. The purpose of these different levels of aggregation is to ensure that our main results are 
not driven by a specific type of level of aggregation. In other words, we want to show that matching 
regional social capital with firm-level performance (while thereby assuming that each firm in a given 
same region faces the same social capital environment) is not a structural issue in terms of 
econometric modelling.4 Moreover, we are fully aware that these results from different levels of 
aggregations are not meaningful ways of robustness checks, as pointed out by Freedman (2004)’s 
ecological fallacy argument especially in the context of social capital (Puntscher et al., 2016). So 
here we are only trying to provide some further evidence of the relationship between social capital 
and firm performance with different ways of sampling. 
Table 3 shows results from the three aggregation levels, with Columns (1) to (3) showing the results 
of the region-industry sample and Columns (4) to (6) giving the results for the postal code-industry 
sample. Results from the region-industry and postal code-industry sample suggest the same: social 
capital is important for firm performance. This in turn implies that the significant and positive effects 
                                                            
4 It should be noted that we have also considered aggregating firm-level performance data onto the 14-region level, but 
decided to drop it later, since the regional level regressions have only 14 observations and therefore in many cases have 
less observations than the number of regressors, which renders these results unreliable. 
15 
 
of social capital on firm performance are universal (in terms of significance) across all industries, so 
that there is no immediate need to explore industry-specific effects. From Columns (1) to (6), all the 
social capital variables are significant in explaining at least one firm performance indicator at a 
specific aggregation level. Moreover, comparing R-squares from the two aggregation levels and the 
firm-level main results, it seems to suggest that both firm-level and postal-code level are ideal 
models, as they give the highest R-squares with full specification (including all variables in the 
regression).5 This gives us another level of confidence that our decision to choose the firm-level 
sample as our core sample is sound, as it gives the best model-fit and contains the highest 
observations. 
            3.4 Robustness Checks 
We perform three types of robustness checks. First, we construct a firm-level social capital measure 
to address the natural drawbacks from using regional-level social capital measures augmented for 
firm-level data. The firm-level social capital measure is an interaction between social capital 
dummies (i.e. high and low trust, high and low norm, and high and low network) based on regional-
level social capital measures and firm size. While this measure gives some level of firm-level 
information associated with social capital through the treatment effect, we acknowledge that it’s only 
our second-best option due to the fact that we don’t have firm-level characteristics that truly reveal 
social capital at the individual level. We also use clustered standard errors for all three firm-level 
measures.
                                                            
5 The R-squares from the regional level regressions are unreliable at 0.99, due to extreme low observations as compared 
with number of variables. 
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Table 2: Social Capital and Firm Performance (OLS firm-level regressions with regional level social capital measures)  
Firm-Level regressions (all variables measured in 2008)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)  
Return 
on Assets 
Return 
on Assets 
Return 
on Assets 
Return 
on Assets 
Return 
on Assets 
Current 
Ratio 
Current 
Ratio 
Current 
Ratio 
Current 
Ratio 
Current 
Ratio 
Solvency 
Ratio 
Solvency 
Ratio 
Solvency 
Ratio 
Solvency 
Ratio 
Solvency 
Ratio 
Social Capital Variables 
Trust 
(domestic) 
0.744** 
(2.47) 
   
-0.136 
(-1.43) 
0.270* 
(1.78) 
   
0.059 
(1.52) 
0.269* 
(2.00) 
   0.070 
(0.58) 
Trust 
(foreign) 
 0.649** 
(2.76) 
  0.294** 
(2.17) 
 0.181** 
(2.82) 
  0.057* 
(1.90) 
 0.121*** 
(3.83) 
  0.302** 
(2.53) 
Norm 
  
0.296* 
(1.77) 
 
0.196** 
(2.37) 
  
0.035*** 
(3.15) 
 
0.027* 
(1.93) 
  0.134*** 
(5.34) 
 0.154*** 
(3.01) 
Network 
(all-group) 
   
1.472** 
(2.62) 
0.029 
(0.08) 
   
0.116* 
(1.89) 
0.159* 
(1.93) 
   0.878*** 
(2.99) 
0.743* 
(1.93) 
Control Variables 
Firm size 
(total 
assets) 
-0.000 
(-0.93) 
-0.000 
(-0.23) 
5.15e-07 
(0.42) 
5.28e-07 
(0.44) 
-6.19e-08 
(1.00) 
-2.71e-07 
(-0.07) 
-2.61e-07 
(-0.77) 
-2.62e-08 
(-1.11) 
-2.70e-08 
(-0.01) 
-2.63e-08 
(-1.08) 
-1.48e-07 
(-0.76) 
0.000 
(0.18) 
-1.47e-07 
(-0.78) 
-0.000 
(-0.47) 
-1.46e-07 
(-0.86) 
Health 
status 
0.599** 
(2.41) 
0.357 
(1.61) 
0.486* 
(1.91) 
0.646** 
(2.98) 
0.051 
(0.69) 
-0.029 
(-0.25) 
0.119* 
(1.89) 
0.052** 
(2.25) 
0.043 
(1.53) 
0.094*** 
(4.53) 
0.192** 
(2.33) 
0.421*** 
(5.56) 
-0.023 
(-0.36) 
-0.318 
(-0.44) 
0.223** 
(2.54) 
High 
education 
0.040 
(0.50) 
-0.096 
(-1.53) 
0.189** 
(2.30) 
0.139 
(1.76) 
0.157** 
(2.09) 
0.131*** 
(3.67) 
0.027 
(0.61) 
0.021* 
(2.11) 
-0.014 
(-1.02) 
-0.037 
(-0.60) 
0.213*** 
(5.32) 
0.313*** 
(5.23) 
0.125*** 
(4.50) 
0.205*** 
(4.96) 
0.123*** 
(4.83) 
Urban 6.032*** 
(3.30) 
6.212*** 
(3.93) 
6.136*** 
(3.11) 
5.734*** 
(3.20) 
2.034** 
(2.34) 
-0.483 
(-0.44) 
-1.745 
(-1.50) 
-0.134 
(-0.79) 
-0.070 
(-0.33) 
-0.055 
(-0.47) 
-0.046 
(-0.07) 
6.972*** 
(4.83) 
0.266 
(0.41) 
1.513 
(1.57) 
-0.621 
(-1.42) 
Border 13.869 
(0.93) 
9.205 
(0.85) 
1.759 
(0.50) 
7.591 
(0.34) 
1.090 
(0.73) 
-2.017 
(-1.17) 
-1.088 
(-0.96) 
-0.067 
(-0.32) 
0.274 
(0.98) 
-0.852* 
(-6.68) 
-1.859* 
(-2.10) 
-1.537*** 
(-4.25) 
-1.568* 
(-1.83) 
2.668 
(0.08) 
-2.352*** 
(-3.63) 
Diagnostic Statistics  
N 158185 158185 158185 158185 158185 169398 169398 169398 169398 169398 177034 177034 177034 177034 177034 
R-sq 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.26 0.11 0.33 0.10 0.16 0.23 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
94.52 
(0.000) 
327.28 
(0.000) 
99.21 
(0.000) 
123.56 
(0.000) 
19.83 
(0.000) 
111.21 
(0.000) 
103.77 
(0.000) 
26.78 
(0.000) 
51.11 
(0.000) 
11.22 
(0.000) 
42.04 
(0.000) 
26.68 
(0.000) 
19.55 
(0.000) 
37.24 
(0.000) 
54.12 
(0.000) 
Notes: The regressions are estimated using OLS with t-values in parentheses produced by standard errors adjusted for clusters in regional level social capital variables. 
In each regression with regional level social capital measures, 14 clusters are identified for the relevant regional level social capital variable, since each regional level social 
capital variable has only 14 unique values. The constants are not reported. Including the Amter dummies (13 out of 14 to avoid perfect collinearity) for the core specification 
shown in Columns (5), (10) and (15) yields no significant changes in r-squared (from 0.24, 0.26 and 0.23 to 0.27, 0.29 and 0.21 respectively). Observations (N), R-squared 
(R-sq), F-statistics and the associated p-values are reported. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted respectively by ***, ** and *. 
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Table 3: Different Levels of Aggregation and Robustness to Firm-level Social Capital Measures 
 Region-Industry Level Sample Postal Code-Industry Level 
Sample 
Firm-level social capital measures 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)  
Return on 
Assets 
Current 
Ratio 
Solvency 
Ratio 
Return on 
Assets 
Current 
Ratio 
Solvency 
Ratio 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Assets 
Current 
Ratio 
Solvency Ratio 
Social Capital Variables 
Trust 
(domestic) 
-0.073 
(-0.12) 
0.050* 
(1.95) 
0.260* 
(1.93) 
-0.359 
(-1.52) 
0.046** 
(2.55) 
0.257* 
(2.09) 
      
Trust 
(foreign) 
1.281** 
(2.42) 
0.025 
(1.06) 
-0.081 
(-0.77) 
0.596** 
(2.24) 
0.059*** 
(4.01) 
-0.109 
(-1.06) 
      
Norm 0.611*** 
(3.22) 
-0.003 
(-0.28) 
0.079* 
(1.77) 
0.263** 
(2.78) 
-0.000 
(-0.17) 
0.081* 
(1.79) 
      
Network 
(All Group) 
2.595* 
(1.86) 
0.201*** 
(3.15) 
0.593** 
(2.49) 
0.011 
(0.02) 
-0.034 
(0.95) 
0.605** 
(2.84) 
      
High 
Trust*Size 
      5.29e-07*** 
(3.13) 
  9.88e-06*** 
(3.55) 
9.70e-06*** 
(8.71) 
1.19e-08 
(0.20) 
High 
Norm*Size 
       1.71e-08*** 
(2.55) 
 8.89e-07*** 
(6.02) 
1.41e-08*** 
(8.99) 
9.17e-07*** 
(7.58) 
High 
Network*S
ize 
        1.31e-07*** 
(11.70) 
1.36e-06*** 
(4.62) 
3.09e-07 
(0.22) 
0.000** 
(2.28) 
Control Variables 
Firm size 
(total 
assets) 
-1.20e-07 
(-0.93) 
3.17e-08 
(0.15) 
-0.000 
(-0.78) 
-5.62e-08 
(-1.01) 
3.90e-08 
(0.07) 
1.78e-07 
(0.52) 
-0.000 
(-1.18) 
-7.62e-08 
(-1.60) 
-1.66e-07 
(-0.22) 
-7.31e-06 
(-1.25) 
-4.21e-07 
(-0.30) 
0.000 
(0.26) 
Health 
status 
-0.673 
(-1.51) 
0.050** 
(2.98) 
0.246*** 
(3.89) 
-0.077 
(-0.43) 
0.054*** 
(3.61) 
0.221*** 
(3.53) 
-0.573 
(-1.07) 
0.097 
(1.33) 
0.143*** 
(2.59) 
0.787*** 
(4.94) 
0.049*** 
(6.23) 
0.188*** 
(7.45) 
High 
education 
0.020 
(0.17) 
0.027*** 
(3.14) 
0.097*** 
(3.38) 
0.215** 
(2.86) 
0.057*** 
(7.93) 
0.109*** 
(5.91) 
-0.006 
(-0.01) 
-0.025 
(-0.20) 
0.139*** 
(5.25) 
-0.091 
(-1.39) 
0.012*** 
(3.82) 
0.085*** 
(7.97) 
Urban 9.025*** 
(4.47) 
0.065 
(0.50) 
0.746* 
(1.90) 
2.340* 
(1.97) 
0.125 
(1.55) 
0.923 
(1.54) 
16.711*** 
(3.31) 
3.469** 
(2.57) 
1.285*** 
(3.20) 
6.179*** 
(6.01) 
-0.078 
(-0.94) 
0.538** 
(2.12) 
Border -10.067*** 
(3.13) 
0.071 
(0.59) 
-0.147 
(-0.34) 
-1.608 
(-0.54) 
-0.546** 
(-2.47) 
0.294 
(0.78) 
-18.507*** 
(-3.27) 
-11.081*** 
(2.84) 
-3.315*** 
(-4.91) 
-16.133*** 
(-11.89) 
0.08 
(1.25) 
-0.819*** 
(3.88) 
Diagnostic Statistics  
N 5097 5113 5353 39808 33931 33391 158185 158185 158185 158185 169398 177034 
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R-sq 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.10 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
70.58 
(0.000) 
15.43 
(0.000) 
24.77 
(0.000) 
59.76 
(0.000) 
18.29 
(0.000) 
33.43 
(0.000) 
25.15 
(0.000) 
9.66 
(0.000) 
96.59 
(0.000) 
100.56 
(0.000) 
14.632 
(0.000) 
42.04 
(0.000) 
Notes: The regressions are estimated using OLS with t-values produced by standard errors adjusted for clusters in both regional and firm-level social 
capital variables. In each regression with regional level social capital measures, 14 clusters are identified for the relevant regional level social capital variable, 
since each regional level social capital variable has only 14 unique values. For firm-level social capital variables, 49,036, 38,937 and 33,979 clusters are 
identified for HighTrust*size, HighNorm*size and HighNetwork*size respectively. The constants are not reported.  Observations (N), R-squared (R-sq), F-
statistics and the associated p-values are reported. Firm level data are aggregated up to the 14 regions, industries (classified by the SIC-4 primary codes) within 
14-region, and industries within postal area (identified by postal codes) levels respectively for the regional level, region-industry level and postal code-industry 
level samples. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted respectively by ***, ** and *. 
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Table 4: Robustness to Alternative Measures of Firm Performance, Network groups and Sampling 
 1999 Firm-level Sample  Alternative 
Measures of 
Firm 
Performance 
Alternative measure of 
Network groups 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Return on 
Assets 
Current 
Ratio 
Solvency 
Ratio 
 Profit 
Margin 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Assets 
Social Capital Variables 
Trust (domestic) 0.093** 
(2.09) 
-0.009 
(-0.86) 
-0.100 
(-0.62) 
-0.245 
(-0.95) 
0.344*** 
(3.33) 
-0.247 
(-1.30) 
Trust (foreign) -0.012 
(-0.24) 
-0.009 
(-0.64) 
0.458*** 
(3.92) 
0.596** 
(2.96) 
0.137 
(0.87) 
0.308** 
(2.63) 
Norm 0.194** 
(2.49) 
0.037** 
(2.76) 
0.239*** 
(5.55) 
0.655*** 
(12.12) 
0.222*** 
(5.21) 
0.146** 
(2.26) 
Network (all-
group) 
1.243** 
(2.73) 
0.036*** 
(5.20) 
0.787** 
(2.50) 
-0.349 
(-0.72) 
  
Network (Putnam) 
    
0.623** 
(2.67) 
 
Network (Olson) 
    
 -0.169 
(-1.55) 
Control Variables 
Firm size (total 
assets) 
-6.31e-08 
(-1.26) 
-2.65e-08 
(-0.27) 
-1.47e-07 
(-0.85) 
-9.16e-08 
(-0.01) 
-5.58e-08 
(-0.10) 
-5.61e-08 
(-0.10) 
Health status 0.254*** 
(6.36) 
-0.012 
(-0.63) 
0.270*** 
(3.39) 
-0.292 
(-1.40) 
0.149* 
(1.80) 
-0.082 
(-1.33) 
High education 0.116* 
(1.90) 
0.023** 
(2.70) 
0.114*** 
(8.01) 
0.385** 
(2.78) 
0.094 
(0.95) 
0.302*** 
(4.16) 
Urban -0.410 
(-0.45) 
0.176 
(0.79) 
-0.244 
(-0.67) 
7.862*** 
(4.57) 
-0.819 
(-0.94) 
1.943*** 
(3.01) 
Border -0.208 
(-0.20) 
-0.644** 
(-2.89) 
-3.680*** 
(-5.20) 
-16.324*** 
(-3.83) 
0.590 
(0.76) 
0.068 
(0.11) 
Diagnostic Statistics 
N 149265 136497 167015 7936 158185 158185 
R-sq 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.11 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
9.72 
(0.000) 
14.63 
(0.000) 
23.74 
(0.000) 
47.44 
(0.000) 
96.59 
(0.000) 
96.56 
(0.000) 
Notes: The regressions are estimated using OLS with t-values produced by standard errors adjusted for 
clusters in regional social capital variables in parentheses. In each regression with regional level social 
capital measures, 14 clusters are identified for the relevant regional level social capital variable, since each 
regional level social capital variable has only 14 unique values. The constants are not reported.  Observations 
(N), R-squared (R-sq), F-statistics and the associated p-values are reported. The 1999 sample regressions 
include the core firm performance indicators: “Return on Assets”, “Current Ratio” and “Solvency Ratio”. The 
Alternative measure of firm performance such as “profit margin” is from the core 2008 sample, they are used 
in the robustness checks only due to their unideal low observations. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels are denoted respectively by ***, ** and *. 
Second, since we have two years of social capital data (1999 and 2008), corresponding to the firm-
level performance data, we decided to nevertheless check whether or not the main results are robust 
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in the 1999 sample. The reason why we choose 2008 over 1999 in the main regressions are twofold: 
(1) it is more recent, and (2) it fully matches the firm performance data, whereas observations in 
1999 for firm performance are very low in our sample, consequently for some observations we use 
the year 2000 or 2001 as a proxy to match the 1999 social capital data. Since this is not ideal, the 
1999 sample is used for robustness check only. Thirdly, we include both an alternative measure of 
firm performance: profit margin and the two network groups (Putnam and Olson) introduced earlier. 
The profit margin variable has very low observations (only around 5% of the other three measures) 
itself, hence not ideal to be included in the main regression. 
Columns (7) to (12) in Table 3 give results from the firm-level social capital measures. It’s quite 
evident that when interacting firm-size with social capital dummies, firms endowed with high trust, 
norm and network environment tend to perform better. The effects of trust, norm and network here 
are also consistent with the core findings introduced in Section 3.2. In particular, norm consistently 
shows weaker impact on performance than the effects from the other two dimensions of social 
capital. It’s important to point out that firm size itself is rather insignificant in explaining firm 
performance as shown by all the regressions in this study. This then means that the source of 
significance of the interactive term (i.e. social capital dummies times firm size) must come from the 
social capital dimension. Overall these significant results suggest that our results are not likely 
driven by the decision to augment regional-level social capital measures for firm-level performance 
information. 
Table 4 gives results on the 1999 sample and the alternative measure of firm performance: profit 
margin and alternative measures of network groups: Network (Putnam) and Network (Olson). The 
1999 sample, albeit with its natural imperfections, shows consistent and strong results with those 
observed in the 2008 core sample. Norms, a weaker firm performance driver in the 2008 core 
sample, in particular, becomes more important in the 1999 sample in terms of significance. The 
influence of social capital on profit margin, our alternative measure of firm performance, is 
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unsurprisingly not strong (due to its low observations) compared with the results from the core 
regressions. Nevertheless, we have identified significant results for trust and network on at least 
three out of the four occasions.  The results from the two network groups are in line with their 
theoretical findings: that the Putnam group represents inclusion and integration, and therefore 
strengthens cooperation and firm performance. The insignificance of the Olson group suggests that 
the special interest-oriented group is at best not important for firm performance. 
In general, the various robustness checks we conduct suggest that our main results are not driven by 
sample structure, are robust to alternative measures of firm performance, network groups and 
different sampling year, and the relationships between social capital and firm performance is 
evident with even imperfect sampling conditions such as low observations and imperfect matching 
of data. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper explores the potential effect of social capital on firm performance, employing a novel 
approach. We explore the business environment in terms of social capital in a given region, rather 
than taking a narrow focus on entrepreneurs’ own social network. Obtaining trust, norm and 
network variables from the Danish and European Values Surveys, the estimations suggest three 
major findings: 
First, social capital as measured by trust, norm and network has significant positive effects on firm 
performance (as measured by return on asset, current ratio and solvency ratio). The magnitude of 
these effects are stronger on return on asset and solvency ratio than on current ratio, suggesting that 
social capital is more important for firms’  long term liquidity and profit than for short term 
liquidity. These anticipated effects (given the long-term nature of building social capital; Healy and 
Côté, 2001) are strong after we control for firm size, health status of local residents, border and 
urban characteristics and local education level. 
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Second, trust in domestic institutions seems to matter more for firm performance than trust in 
foreign institutions, which is not surprising since local firm characteristics have for the average firm 
likely more to do with the domestic institutional environment rather than with foreign institutional 
environments. Networks are generally found to positively influence firm performance, although the 
growth-enhancing Putnam group networking matters more for firm performance than the special 
interest-oriented Olson group.  
Third, the above results are consistent under the regional, region-industry and postal code-industry 
level of sampling, suggesting that there are no industry-specific differences in the significance of 
these effects. Using alternative measure of firm performance (profit margin), the 1999 sample and 
firm-level social capital measures yield similar results, suggesting overall robust relationship 
between social capital and firm performance. 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the above results have to be interpreted with 
caution, given a number of caveats that could not be addressed with the current data availability. 
First, considering the OLS approach and in the absence of a panel (instrumental variables approach), 
the issue of causal inference remains. Second, a number of limitations of variable definitions (a 
possibly too narrow and homogeneous assumption underlying various metrics) may be underlying 
the estimation results, despite the fact that data was employed from well-calibrated sources 
(European and Danish Value Surveys). Third, since true firm-level social capital information is not 
available, our analysis using constructed firm-level social capital measures and regional social 
capital measures might suffer omitted variable bias. Due to the limited number of control variables 
available, it’s possible that this analysis suffers also from omitted variable bias from the control 
variable dimension. The low R-squared present (from 0.05 to 0.33) throughout this analysis could 
be a manifestation of the limited number of explanatory variables available to our dataset. 
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Online Appendix (not to be published in the text version) 
Table A1: Social Capital Variables Construction: Constituting Variables and PCA coefficients  
Social Capital Variables Constituting Variables in Danish Value studies  First PCA 
Coefficients 
First PCA 
Coefficients for 
Network (All Group) 
Trust (domestic) People can be trusted, percentage of respondents answered “yes” are taken for a given 
region (Amt) 
0.158  
 How much confidence in church, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal and 
“quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.012  
 How much confidence in armed forces, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal 
and “quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.363  
 How much confidence in education system, percentage of respondents answered “a great 
deal and “quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.268  
 How much confidence in the press, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal and 
“quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.303  
 How much confidence in trade unions, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal 
and “quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.159  
 How much confidence in the police, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal and 
“quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.343  
 How much confidence in parliament, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal and 
“quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.033  
 How much confidence in civil service, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal and 
“quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.262  
 How much confidence in social security system, percentage of respondents answered “a 
great deal and “quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.266  
 How much confidence in health care system, percentage of respondents answered “a great 
deal and “quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.396  
 How much confidence in justice system, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal 
and “quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.260  
 How much confidence in major companies, percentage of respondents answered “a great 
deal and “quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.279  
 How much confidence in environmental organizations, percentage of respondents answered 
“a great deal and “quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.009  
 How much confidence in political parties, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal 
and “quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.149  
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 How much confidence in government, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal and 
“quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.263  
Trust (foreign) How much confidence in European Union, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal 
and “quite a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.516  
 How much confidence in Nato, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal and “quite 
a lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.640  
 How much confidence in UN, percentage of respondents answered “a great deal and “quite a 
lot” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.568  
Norm  Do you justify: cheating on tax, percentage of respondents that answered “never” are taken 
for a given region (Amt) 
0.162  
 Do you justify: taking illegal drugs, percentage of respondents that answered “never” are 
taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.430  
 Do you justify: lying in own interest, percentage of respondents that answered “never” are 
taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.389  
 Do you justify: adultry, percentage of respondents that answered “never” are taken for a 
given region (Amt) 
0.386  
 Do you justify: accepting a bribe, percentage of respondents that answered “never” are taken 
for a given region (Amt) 
0.062  
 Do you justify: paying cash to avoid taxes, percentage of respondents that answered “never” 
are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.132  
 Do you justify: avoiding fare on public transportation, percentage of respondents that 
answered “never” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.344  
 Do you justify: illegal prostitution, percentage of respondents that answered “never” are 
taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.134  
 Do you justify: experiments on human embryos, percentage of respondents that answered 
“never” are taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.399  
 Do you justify: manipulating food, percentage of respondents that answered “never” are 
taken for a given region (Amt) 
0.357  
 Do you justify: death penalty, percentage of respondents that answered “never” are taken for 
a given region (Amt) 
0.113  
 Do you justify: drunk driving, percentage of respondents that answered “never” are taken for 
a given region (Amt) 
0.177  
Network (Putnam group) Do you belong to religious organization, percentage of respondents answered “yes” in a 
given region (Amt) are taken. 
0.355 0.121 
 Do you belong to cultural activities, percentage of respondents answered “yes” in a given 
region (Amt) are taken. 
0.610 0.469 
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 Do you belong to Arts, music organization percentage of respondents answered “yes” in a 
given region (Amt) are taken. 
0.557 0.313 
 Do you belong to Sports/recreation organization, percentage of respondents answered “yes” 
in a given region (Amt) are taken. 
0.254 0.101 
 Do you belong to education organization, percentage of respondents answered “yes” in a 
given region (Amt) are taken. 
0.353 0.335 
Network (Olson group) Do you belong to trade union, percentage of respondents answered “yes” in a given region 
(Amt) are taken. 
0.072 0.071 
 Do you belong to political parties/groups, percentage of respondents answered “yes” in a 
given region (Amt) are taken. 
0.568 0.402 
 Do you belong to development/human rights, percentage of respondents answered “yes” in 
a given region (Amt) are taken. 
0.620 0.477 
 Do you belong to professional associations, percentage of respondents answered “yes” in a 
given region (Amt) are taken. 
0.536 0.389 
Notes: Network (all group) is the first PCA combination of variables from both the Putnam and Olson groups, corresponding PCA weights are given in 
the right most column next to PCA weights for Network (Putnam) and Network (Olson) respectively. The first PCA combinations of trust, norm, 
network, network (Putnam group) and network (Olson group) related variables represent respectively 57.2%, 47.8%, 43.1%, 61.2% and 60.7% of the 
total variance of the original non-combined variables. The first PCA weighting coefficients are re-scaled so that they add up to 1, hence combined 
variables (trust, norm, network (all group), network (Putnam), network (Olson)) also fall into the 0 to 100 percentage-point range. 
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Table A2: Correlation Between Main Variables (2008 firm-level sample) 
 Return 
on 
Asset 
Current 
Ratio 
Solvency 
Ratio 
Trust 
(domestic) 
Trust 
(foreign) 
Norm Network 
(all group) 
Network 
(Putnam) 
Network 
(Olson) 
Firm size 
(total 
assets) 
Health 
status 
High 
education 
Urban Border 
Return on 
Asset 
1              
Current 
Ratio 
-0.02 1             
Solvency 
Ratio 
-0.01 0.47 1            
Trust 
(domestic) 
0.18 0.15 0.14 1           
Trust 
(foreign) 
0.11 0.14 0.10 0.18 1          
Norm 0.07 0.16 0.24 0.28 0.27 1         
Network 
(all-group) 
0.11 0.18 0.19 0.11 0.13 0.40 1        
Network 
(Putnam) 
0.11 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.49 0.02 0.41 1       
Network 
(Olson) 
0.11 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.40 0.20 0.89 0.65 1      
Firm size 
(total 
assets) 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1     
Health 
status 
0.19 0.21 0.14 -0.15 0.01 0.01 0.33 -0.02 0.13 0.00 1    
High 
education 
0.16 0.17 0.10 -0.58 0.02 0.01 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.00 0.60 1   
Urban 0.09 0.15 0.03 -0.11 0.57 -0.43 0.06 -0.17 -0.12 0.00 0.55 0.54 1  
Border -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 0.32 0.36 -0.07 -0.47 -0.46 -0.55 -0.00 -0.39 -0.31 0.23 1 
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Table A3: Multicollinearity Test 
Note: the null hypothesis for all tests are that there’s no correlation among the explanatory variables tested  
Dependent Variable: ROE 
(1) Farrar-Glauber Multicollinearity Chi-squares Test  
Chi2 Test = 6.27e+05    P-Value > Chi2(36) 0.0000 
(2) Farrar-Glauber Multicollinearity F-Test: 
Variable F-test DF1 DF2 P-value 
trust (domestic) 3.0e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
trust (foreign) 3.0e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
norm 2.2e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
network 2.5e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
firm size 1.182 1.7e+05 8.000 0.438 
health 4.0e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
high education 4.8e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
urban 5.3e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
border 4.2e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
(3) Farrar-Glauber Multicollinearity t-test: 
Variable trust 
(domestic) 
trust 
(foreign) 
norm network firm size health high education urban border 
trust          
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(domestic) 
trust 
(foreign) 
48.238         
norm 58.020 226.153        
network -169.986 92.591 89.448       
firm size 0.181 -1.021 -1.418 -0.987      
health 120.402 -48.933 -152.092 -2.659 1.437     
high 
education 
94.837 -262.049 -236.184 -19.648 2.293 299.300    
urban 251.633 -26.970 -51.805 -56.338 2.134 263.897 257.482   
border 51.149 149.929 165.643 -111.180 0.445 -169.810 -129.778 93.593  
 
Dependent Variable: Current Ratio 
(1) Farrar-Glauber Multicollinearity Chi-squares Test  
Chi2 Test = 6.74e+05    P-Value > Chi2(36) 0.0000 
(2) Farrar-Glauber Multicollinearity F-Test: 
Variable F-test DF1 DF2 P-value 
trust (domestic) 3.2e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
trust (foreign) 3.3e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
norm 2.4e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
network 2.7e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
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firm size 0.176 1.7e+05 8.000 0.808 
health 4.2e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
high education 5.2e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
urban 5.7e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
border 4.5e+04 1.7e+05 8.000 0.000 
(3) Farrar-Glauber Multicollinearity t-test: 
Variable trust 
(domestic) 
trust 
(foreign) 
norm network firm size health high education urban border 
trust 
(domestic) 
         
trust 
(foreign) 
49.233         
norm 62.007 234.308        
network -173.863 97.024 93.532       
firm size 0.195 -1.056 -1.023 -0.213      
health 124.551 -50.376 -156.581 -4.033 1.160     
high 
education 
98.446 -272.965 -243.344 -20.715 2.143 309.390    
urban 262.384 -28.534 -53.322 -59.698 1.653 272.636 269.459   
border 53.142 155.455 170.928 -114.593 -0.029 -175.652 -134.474 96.076  
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Dependent Variable: Solvency Ratio 
(1) Farrar-Glauber Multicollinearity Chi-squares Test  
Chi2 Test = 7.02e+05    P-Value > Chi2(36) 0.0000 
(2) Farrar-Glauber Multicollinearity F-Test: 
Variable F-test DF1 DF2 P-value 
trust (domestic) 3.4e+04 1.8e+05 8.000 0.000 
trust (foreign) 3.4e+04 1.8e+05 8.000 0.000 
norm 2.5e+04 1.8e+05 8.000 0.000 
network 2.8e+04 1.8e+05 8.000 0.000 
firm size 1.188 1.8e+05 8.000 0.434 
health 4.5e+04 1.8e+05 8.000 0.000 
high education 5.4e+04 1.8e+05 8.000 0.000 
urban 5.9e+04 1.8e+05 8.000 0.000 
border 4.7e+04 1.8e+05 8.000 0.000 
(3) Farrar-Glauber Multicollinearity t-test: 
Variable trust 
(domestic) 
trust 
(foreign) 
norm network firm size health high education urban border 
trust 
(domestic) 
         
trust 
(foreign) 
50.444         
35 
 
norm 61.487 238.984        
network -178.913 98.560 95.699       
firm size 0.179 -1.020 -1.422 -0.991      
health 127.167 -51.599 -161.223 -3.889 1.442     
high 
education 
100.496 -278.443 -249.657 -21.171 2.300 316.413    
urban 266.671 -29.375 -55.639 -60.363 2.137 279.804 274.277   
border 54.079 158.232 174.744 -117.073 0.446 -179.238 -137.030 98.318  
 
